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The Story 
Allocating 
Authority Among States 
Shaffer v. Heitner1 is one of a long series of Supreme Court cases 
addressing the scope of state-court territorial authority. Indeed, Shaffer 
is the first of a dozen modern cases that delineated the Court's current 
conception of the constitutional limits on state-court jurisdictional au-
thority. 
Determining whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute is an 
important preliminary step in any litigation. But the constitutional 
doctrine the Court has developed in this area is also an interesting 
window on the Court's more general understanding of the allocation of 
power among the states. 
Social and Legal Background 
The jurisdictional authority of a court is determined in the first 
instance by the law of the sovereign that establishes the court. The 
sovereign may choose to limit its courts' authority or it may take an 
expansive approach. France, for example, has adopted an expansive 
approach-French law gives French courts jurisdiction over all cases in 
which the plaintiff is French, regardless of whether the defendant or the 
events in question have any connection with France.2 Jurisdictional 
authority is also delineated in part by what other sovereigns are willing 
to recognize. France may issue a judgment but if neither the defendant 
nor the defendant's property is located in France, then a successful 
1433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
2 See Code civil art. 14 (Fr.). 
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French plaintiff will have to rely on the willingness of other sovereigns 
to enforce the judgment. If other sovereigns conclude that France has 
exceeded the scope of its legitimate authority, they will not enforce the 
judgment. Countries can, of course, enter into treaties whereby they 
agree on the scope of their respective courts' jurisdiction and obligations 
to enforce judgments, but, absent a treaty, the primary external limita-
tion on one country's jurisdictional authority is the pragmatic concern of 
whether other countries will enforce its judgments. 
Within the United States, the states can also delineate the scope of 
their courts' jurisdictional authority. However, unlike the relationship 
among countries, the limits of jurisdictional authority (as well as the 
obligation to enforce sister-state judgments) is ultimately controlled by 
the U.S. Constitution. The foundational case that both solidified jurisdic-
tion as a constitutional issue and delineated the framework for analyzing 
this issue is Pennoyer v. Neff 3 
That case involved a claim for nonpayment of fees brought by an 
Oregon attorney against his former client, and the Court held that 
Oregon lacked jurisdiction. According to the Court, there were only two 
ways that Oregon could have gotten jurisdiction. First, if the defendant 
had property in Oregon, that property could have been attached at the 
outset of the litigation. This would have permitted a form of in rem 
jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is only "over the thing" and not over the 
defendant, and is therefore limited to the value of the property. Second, 
the other form of jurisdiction is jurisdiction in personam, or jurisdiction 
"over the person." In personam jurisdiction potentially subjects a defen-
dant to unlimited liability, but the Court held that it was available only 
if this defendant had been served with process in the state, which had 
not happened in Pennoyer. 
The Court based its analysis on "two well established principles of 
public law,'' that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover-
eignty over persons and property within its territory" and that "no State 
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property 
without its territory."4 The result of Pennoyer was a relatively straight-
forward jurisdictional framework: in the absence of the defendant's 
consent, states could constitutionally assert judicial jurisdiction only by 
attaching property located in the state or by serving the defendant with 
process in the state. The Court also introduced an important doctrinal 
innovation-it grounded the limitations on state-court, jurisdictional 
3 95 U.S. 714 (1878). For a fuller discussion of the facts of the case, see Wendy Collins 
Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer 
Reconsidered, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 479 (1987). 
4 95 U.S. at 722. 
WENDY COLLINS PE 
authority in the new 
Amendment. 
The realities of . 
this framework. To l 
traditional rule had l 
incorporation and he 
was not a problem so 
But with the growth 
could inflict harm far 
remained on the vie· 
redress. The courts r 
tion, but by finding 
conducted significant 
increasing ridicule fro 
it was "transcendent~ 
tion was "present"-· 
analyzed as if they we 
Modern transpor1 
proach. With the adv 
state, cause harm, an 
home could find hims1 
far from home to see 
"consent" statutes u1 
deemed to have implic 
to be their agent fo 
automobile accident. 7 
be served in-state-wi 
or her out-of-state he 
more real than the "pi 
A final way that 
defendants was throu: 
out-of-state debtors wi 
century.8 As noted ear 
to be limited to the 
limitation, it was a va 
5 See Joseph J. Kalo, c1 
Quasi In Rem and In Person 
6 Felix Cohen, Transcen 
Rev. 809, 810 (1935). 
7 See Hess v. Pawloski, ;;: 
8 See Joseph J. Kalo, J 
Quasi In Rem and In Person 
STORY OF SHAFFER 
.s of other sovereigns 
lude that France has 
' will not enforce the 
·eaties whereby they 
iction and obligations 
nary external limita-
pragmatic concern of 
lelineate the scope of 
tlike the relationship 
ority (as well as the 
imately controlled by 
)th solidified jurisdic-
nework for analyzing 
f fees brought by an 
the Court held that 
there were only two 
irst, if the defendant 
been attached at the 
~d a form of in rem 
rig" and not over the 
;he property. Second, 
,onam, or jurisdiction 
_ally subjects a defen-
it was available only 
the state, which had 
:iblished principles of 
irisdiction and sover-
1" and that "no State 
persons or property 
a relatively straight-
~ of the defendant's 
1 jurisdiction only by 
g the defendant with 
_ important doctrinal 
~-court jurisdictional 
ie case, see Wendy Collins 
rurisdiction and Pennoyer 
WENDY COLLINS PERDUE 131 
authority in the newly adopted Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The realities of a modernizing society put increasing pressure on 
this framework.. To begin, there was the problem of corporations. The 
traditional rule had been that corporations exist only in their state of 
incorporation and hence could only be served with process there. This 
was not a problem so long as corporate enterprises were essentially local. 
But with the growth of the interstate corporate enterprise, corporations 
could inflict harm far from their state of incorporation. Yet the burden 
remained on the victim to travel to the defendant in order to seek 
redress. The courts responded not by changing the Pennoyer formula-
tion, but by finding that corporations were "present" wherever they 
conducted significant activities. 5 This judicial technique came under 
increasing ridicule from legal realists. In the words of one commentator, 
it was "transcendental nonsense" to try to determine where a corpora-
tion was "present" -corporations were not "things" and ought not be 
analyzed as if they were. 6 
Modern transportation added to the pressure on the Pennoyer ap-
proach. With the advent of the automobile, people could drive into a 
state, cause harm, and leave. Once again, a victim who had never left 
home could find himself or herself saddled with the burden of traveling 
far from home to seek redress. States addressed this issue by passing 
"consent" statutes under which people who drove into the state were 
deemed to have implicitly consented to the appointment of a state official 
to be their agent for service of process for any suit involving an 
automobile accident.7 Consistent with Pennoyer, that official could then 
be served in-state-with notice of the suit mailed to the defendant at his 
or her out-of-state home. Of course, this supposed "consent" was no 
more real than the "presence" of an out-of-state corporation. 
A final way that the courts dealt with the problems of distant 
defendants was through in rem jurisdiction. Attaching the property of 
out-of-state debtors was a technique that dated back to the seventeenth 
century.8 As noted earlier, in this country such jurisdiction was deemed 
to be limited to the value of the property. However, even with this 
limitation, it was a valuable device for asserting jurisdiction. When the 
5 See Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of 
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Jurisdiction, 1978 Duke L.J. 1147, 1176-80. 
6 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 809, 810 (1935). 
7 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
s See Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of 
Quasi In Rem and In Personam Jurisdiction, 1978 Duke L.J. 1147, 1161. 
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underlying lawsuit had nothing to do with the property, this technique 
was called quasi in rem or "attachment jurisdiction"; when the dispute 
concerned ownership of the property itself, as in a condemnation proce-
dure, the technique was sometimes called a true in rem procedure. 
Whether in rem or quasi in rem, Pennoyer had reinforced the validity of 
attaching property as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction. In Harris v. 
Balk,9 the Court reaffirmed the validity of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
There the Court held that a plaintiff could assert jurisdiction by attach-
ing the defendant's property held by another person in the forum state. 
In Harris, the property that was attached was a debt owed to the 
defendant, and the debt was attached by serving the defendant's debtor 
while the debtor was passing through the forum state. Thus, the case not 
only reaffirmed the continued validity of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but 
also upheld it even as applied to intangible property. 
In 1945, in the landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, the Court embarked on a new approach to analyzing 
jurisdiction, at least with respect to in personam cases. The Court 
rejected continued reliance on fictions such as "presence" for corpora-
tions, explaining that "the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely 
to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state 
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due 
process." The Court then announced a new approach: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. " 10 
But this new test for jurisdiction was remarkably vague. Indeed, Justice 
Black in his concurrence expressed concern that the "elastic standards" 
set forth by the majority might be used to deprive states of "the right to 
afford judicial protection to its citizens on the ground that it would be 
more 'convenient' for the corporation to be sued somewhere else." 11 
During the 1950s the Court decided a series of cases that explored 
the meaning of this test, but the holdings and language of these cases 
left uncertainty.12 Some cases, like McGee v. International Life Insurance 
9 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
10 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945) (quoting "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice" from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
11 Id. at 325 (Black, J., concurring). 
12 See Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In 
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 593-623 (1958). 
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Co.,13 suggested that it was sufficient for jurisdiction that the litigation 
have some nexus with the forum. Other cases, like Hanson v. Denckla,14 
emphasized that the defendant must have purposefully connected him-
self with the forum. 
Whatever the precise contours of the rule set out by International 
Shoe, the holding of that case had undermined one of the core premises 
of Pennoyer-that states could assert no direct jurisdiction over people 
outside the state. Though it did not directly address the other premise-
that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within its territory" -some commentators saw 
that this principle was vulnerable as well. 15 In addition, courts and 
commentators had begun to question the continuing coherence of the in 
rem, quasi in rem, and in personam distinction.16 ''The phrase 'judicial 
jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customarily elliptical way of referring to 
jurisdiction over the interests of a person in a thing," observed the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.17 
International Shoe was not the only source of a potential due process 
challenge to attachment jurisdiction. Beginning in 1969 with Sniadach v. 
Family Finance Corp., 18 the Supreme Court decided a series of cases 
concerning the right of a property owner to notice and hearing before his 
or her property was attached. These cases recognized that prior notice 
and hearing were not required in "exceptional situations" and suggested 
that attachment for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction might be such an 
exceptional situation.19 Nonetheless, these references to attachment ju-
risdiction had been dicta, and the Court had not fully explored what the 
contours of the exception might be. These two lines of due process case 
law-the substantive International Shoe thread and the procedural Snia-
13 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
14 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
15 See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956). 
16 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950); 
Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 617 (1958). 
17 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 56 introductory note (1971). 
18 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 
(1975). This line of cases is discussed infra ch. 4: Robert G. Bone, The Story of Connecticut 
v. Doehr: Balancing Costs and Benefits in Defining Procedural Rights. 
19 See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 
(1974). 
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dach thread-coalesced to lay the foundation for the constitutional 
challenges in Shaffer v. Heitner. 
Factual Background 
The underlying facts of Shaffer date back at least twenty years 
before the suit was filed. Between 194 7 and 1956, the Greyhound 
Corporation, the largest bus company in the country, had acquired a 
number of regional bus companies in the western United States. Mt. 
Hood Stages, another regional carrier, had objected to several of these 
acquisitions out of fear that Greyhound would use its new market power 
to drive Mt. Hood out of business. In response to these objections and in 
order to get approval from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
for the acquisitions, Greyhound made representations and gave assur-
ances that it would not discriminate against or otherwise disadvantage 
Mt. Hood. By the mid-1960s it became clear that Mt. Hood's fears had 
been well-founded. Although Greyhound brochures included information 
about connections with other bus lines, they omitted references to Mt. 
Hood. In addition, Greyhound changed some of its routes and schedules 
so that transfers between Greyhound and Mt. Hood buses would be 
inconvenient. Mt. Hood's ridership began to drop significantly. 
In 1968, the ICC ordered Greyhound to cease and desist from 
engaging in these practices.20 That same year, Mt. Hood filed a civil 
antitrust action against Greyhound. The year 1973 proved to be another 
bad one for Greyhound. It lost the antitrust action by jury verdict, and 
the court awarded Mt. Hood close to $15 million in damages and 
attorneys' fees. 21 A month later, a different federal district court found 
Greyhound (and its wholly owned California subsidiary, Greyhound 
Lines, along with three of their officers, including R.F. Shaffer, Grey-
hound's president) guilty of both criminal and civil contempt of court for 
violating the 1968 cease-and-desist order; the court then found that the 
corporation had engaged in "willful and deliberate defiance" and as-
sessed a fine of $600,000.22 
A corporation is a legal entity but can act only through its officers, 
directors, and employees. The officers and directors of Greyhound had 
20 In re Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M.C.C. 449 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 308 F.Supp. 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
21 The loss in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon was 
eventually affirmed. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555'F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 
1977), vacated, 437 U.S. 322, remanded, 583 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1978), re-entered, 1979 WL 
1583 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831 (1980). 
22 United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973), enforced, 370 
F.Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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allowed the company to engage in a course of conduct with respect to Mt. 
Hood that had cost the company over $15 million in damages and 
penalties. The value of the company to its shareholders had thus been 
diminished. In, theory, the corporation could bring suit against its own 
officers and directors whose decisions had caused the company to have to 
pay out these awards. However, since the decision to bring suit has to be 
made by the officers and directors, it is not surprising they did not see fit 
to bring suit on Greyhound's behalf against themselves. 
In order to protect the interests of shareholders, the law provides an 
alternative mechanism by which such suits can be initiated. Since it is 
ultimately shareholders who suffer from a diminution in the assets of a 
corporation, one or more shareholders can initiate a "shareholders' 
derivative action" on behalf of the corporation. Any recovery in a 
shareholders' derivative action goes to the corporation, not to the indi-
vidual shareholder-plaintiff who initiated the suit. In such suits, the 
corporation is a necessary party. Although the corporation is the intend-
ed beneficiary and therefore might be considered a plaintiff, it is joined 
as a defendant because, having not initiated litigation in its own behalf, 
it is usually not supportive of the plaintiff's claim. 
Accordingly, Shaffer v. Heitner was a shareholders' derivative suit 
brought on behalf of the Greyhound Corporation against the officers and 
directors of Greyhound and its California subsidiary and against the two 
corporations. The shareholder-plaintiff in Shaffer was Arnold Heitner, a 
citizen of New York. Heitner's six-year-old son, Mark, had been given 
one share of Greyhound stock when he was born, and Arnold was 
custodian for his son. Arnold Heitner and his lawyer, Michael Maschio, 
have different recollections of how Heitner came to be the plaintiff. 
According to Heitner, a lawyer acquaintance had mentioned that another 
lawyer was looking for someone who owned Greyhound stock and was 
willing to be a plaintiff in a suit.23 Arnold mentioned his son's one share 
of stock and became the plaintiff. Maschio, on the other hand, recalled 
that Heitner had previously been a client of the firm and that Heitner, 
after reading about Greyhound and the contempt citation, initiated the 
contact. Maschio was quite adamant that the firm had not sought out 
Heitner or any other Greyhound stockholders.24 
To those who brought the suit, this undoubtedly looked like a 
promising claim. Three Greyhound officers had been found guilty of 
contempt of court, and the conduct that was the basis for that finding 
was essentially the same conduct that resulted in the large antitrust 
verdict. Although officers and directors are generally protected from 
judicial second-guessing of their decisions by a doctrine known as the 
23 Telephone Interview with Arnold Heitner (Aug. 1, 2003). 
24 Telephone Interview with Michael Maschio (Oct. 13, 2003). 
136 THE STORY OF SHAFFER 
business judgment rule, the rule might not protect willful and deliberate 
conduct that was itself a violation of a court order. 
Prior Proceedings 
Complaint. In May 1974, five months after the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois announced the 
amount of the penalty for the criminal contempt, Heitner filed the 
shareholders' derivative action in the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
against twenty-eight present and former officers and directors of the 
defendant Greyhound Corporation and of the defendant subsidiary cor-
poration, Greyhound Lines. The Greyhound Corporation was incorporat-
ed in Delaware; at the time of the ICC order, its headquarters had been 
located in Chicago (which is why the litigation about the cease-and-desist 
order was in the Northern District of Illinois), but in 1971 it had moved 
its headquarters to Phoenix, Arizona. Greyhound Lines was incorporated 
in California with its headquarters in Phoenix. None of the officers and 
directors named were citizens of Delaware. 
The complaint described the contempt finding and the antitrust 
verdict, along with the conduct of Greyhound that resulted in these 
setbacks. It alleged that each of the individual defendants "engaged in or 
acquiesced in the transactions referred to above and acted recklessly, 
negligently and in disregard of his obligations as director or officer of 
Greyhound."25 It further alleged that the deferred compensation plan for 
officers, directors, and employees of Greyhound was "excessive, unlaw-
ful, improvident and wasteful resulting in large damages to Greyhound 
and its stockholders."26 The complaint sought both unspecified damages 
from the defendants and termination of payments to the defendants 
under the deferred compensation plan. 
Jurisdiction. Delaware law deems the stock of a Delaware corpora-
tion to be located in Delaware.27 Under its so-called sequestration proce-
dure, the stock is attached by delivering notice, usually accompanied by a 
stop-transfer order, to the corporation's registered agent in Delaware.28 
The owner of the stock is sent a copy of the complaint and is offered the 
choice either to enter an appearance thereby bestowing in personam 
jurisdiction or to forfeit the stock. 
The sequestration procedure had been available in Delaware since 
1927. Although it was not limited to corporate cases, its primary use was 
25 Complaint ~ 16. 
26 Id. at ~ 23. 
27 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 169 (1975). 
28 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 366 (1975). 
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for litigation involving officers and directors of Delaware corporations.29 
This use was an important one. Without some mechanism for assuring 
that the directors of a corporation are subject to suit in one place, it 
could be diffi~ult for a shareholder to enforce directors' obligations. 
Outside directors might have no connection either with the state of 
incorporation or with the headquarters state. Where the allegation is 
that a board failed to take action, it might be particularly difficult to 
determine where that failure to act occurred. Thus, there might be no 
single place with which all the directors have contacts or connections.30 
Of course, the sequestration procedure was only available against those 
officers and directors who owned stock, but this limitation had apparent-
ly not proved problematic. 
This unavailability of an alternative forum may have existed in 
Shaffer. The individual defendants resided in nine different states. The 
contempt finding was in Illinois but concerned conduct the effects of 
which were primarily felt in Oregon. The record does not reflect where 
the board of directors physically met for critical meetings or which 
directors might have been present at those meetings. However, since the 
basic allegation was that the board failed to take necessary compliance 
steps, it would be difficult to determine where that failure to act 
occurred. As noted earlier, Greyhound's headquarters moved from Chica-
go to Phoenix in 1971. Although the lack of an alternative forum might 
have been an argument to support jurisdiction in Delaware, the plain-
tiffs lawyer never raised this argument. On the contrary, when asked at 
oral argument in the U.S. Supreme Court whether an alternative forum 
was available where all the parties could be joined, Maschio indicated 
that "the wrongdoing took place probably-most probably out on the 
coast" and that jurisdiction over the defendants in the place of the 
wrongdoing was a "possibility."31 At no time did he indicate that there 
could be difficulties securing in personam jurisdiction outside Delaware, 
nor was there any discussion of what the alternative forum might be for 
challenging the lawfulness of the deferred compensation plan. 
Regardless of whether an alternative forum was available in Shaffer 
v. Heitner, the plaintiff's attorney decided to sue in Delaware by using its 
sequestration provision. He followed all the necessary steps to sequester 
the stock owned by most of the individual defendants, over $1 million in 
value. In response, those defendants filed a motion to quash and vacate 
29 See Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 290 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1972). 
30 See Sue Ann Dillport, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Directors, Officers, and Share-
holders: "Director" Consent Statutes After Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 255, 262-
63 (1979). 
31 Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28. 
..._ 
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the sequestration order. The stage was now set for this piece of corporate 
litigation to become an important civil procedure case. 
State-Court Decisions. Both the Delaware Court of Chancery32 
and the Delaware Supreme Court33 rejected the defendants' challenge to 
the sequestration statute. The opinions of these courts are revealing 
because they highlight that the defendants did not raise a frontal assault 
on quasi in rem jurisdiction. On the contrary, according to the Chancery 
Court, the defendants "recogniz[ed] that a state can obtain jurisdiction 
over nonresidents by an in rem attachment of their property within the 
state,''34 but raised a number of issues concerning attachment under the 
sequestration statute. These arguments, which are clearly s-et forth in 
the opinion of the vice chancellor, were more narrow in scope than the 
grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court would ultimately face in deciding 
the case. 
First, the defendants contended that the stock could not be attached 
in Delaware because it was not actually located in Delaware. They noted 
that Delaware was the only state that considered stock to be located in 
the state of incorporation, whereas all the other states deem stock to be 
located where the stock certificates are held. The vice chancellor rejected 
this argument noting that a "shareholder owns a proportionate interest 
in his corporation which is represented by a stock certificate," and that 
sequestration "seeks to seize his ownership interest in the corporation, 
not merely his documentary indicia of ownership." He further noted that 
if the location of the certificate is treated as the critical situs, then "a 
stockholder who lost his certificate could not have his stock interest 
attached by any court, any where in the event he chose not to seek a new 
one."35 
Second, the defendants argued that sequestration was an unconsti-
tutional seizure of their property without prior notice and hearing. This 
argument was the primary constitutional challenge both in the Delaware 
courts and in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both Delaware courts rejected 
this argument, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had indicated that 
attachment without prior notice and hearing was permissible in "ex-
traordinary situations" and had specifically mentioned "attachment 
necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court" as one of these extraordi-
nary situations.36 Indeed, in this context, several recent times the U.S. 
32 Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., 1975 WL 417 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1975). 
33 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976). 
34 1975 WL at *7. 
35 Id. at *3 [sic]. 
36 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 n.23 (1972) . 
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Supreme Court had cited with apparent approval Ownbey v. Morgan, 37 
an older U.S. Supreme Court case that had upheld a Delaware statute 
requiring a defendant to post bond in order to appear and defend an 
attachment suit.38 
Third, th~ defendants asserted that this was not really a quasi in 
rem proceeding because they were not given the opportunity to appear 
and defend the property attached. Instead, the Delaware sequestration 
procedure gave only the choice of submitting to in personam jurisdiction 
or forfeiting the property. In rejecting this argument, both the Delaware 
courts assumed that the state could constitutionally compel a defen-
dant's appearance to the extent of the value of the property. The 
analysis focused on whether the state could, in essence, leverage a valid 
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction into in personam jurisdiction, and 
both courts concluded that this was permissible. 
Neither Delaware court devoted much of its analysis to International 
Shoe and its significance. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court observed 
that there were "significant constitutional questions at issue here but we 
say at once that we do not deem the rule of International Shoe to be one 
of them.' '39 
U.S. Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the parties continued 
to frame the issue narrowly. First, the primary focus of the briefs on the 
merits and of the oral arguments was on whether a pre-attachment 
notice and hearing were required. At oral argument, John Reese, arguing 
for the appellants, did not even cite International Shoe. That case was 
raised for the first time by one of the Justices late in Reese's argument.40 
Second, the personal jurisdiction argument that appellants did raise did 
not make any broad attack on in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Reese 
instead argued that in this case, the statute was used to coerce in 
personam jurisdiction and that it should therefore be subject to the same 
due process standard as any other exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 
In other words, the defendants did not argue that actions in rem and 
quasi in rem should be treated like actions in personam, only that "all 
assertions of in personam jurisdiction, under any guise or label, are 
subject to the same due process requirements."41 Reese emphasized that 
this statute resulted in defendants' being subject to in personam jurisdic-
37 256 U.S. 94 (1921). 
38 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 91 n.23 (1972); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 n.13 
(1974). 
39 361 A.2d at 229. 
40 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22. 
41 Appellants' Reply Brief on the Merits at 8. 
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tion. "Today the issue is whether the Delaware sequestration statute can 
constitutionally be applied to sequester the defendants' stock as a means 
for coercing their general appearance in the action," he explained in his 
opening statement to the Court.42 
Heitner's brief similarly focused on whether pre-attachment notice 
and hearing were required. His brief argued that attaching property for 
the purpose of securing jurisdiction was an "extraordinary situation" 
and hence pre-attachment notice and hearing were not required.43 In 
response to the argument that the sequestration statute improperly 
coerced in personam jurisdiction, the appellee countered that the defen-
dants had sufficient contacts to be subject to in personam jurisdiction 
and noted that some states had enacted statutes that specifically con-
ferred jurisdiction over out-of-state directors.44 But this response created 
something of a box for Heitner's lawyer, as one of the Justices pointed 
out at the end of the argument. In explaining why there was no right to 
pre-seizure notice and hearing, Heitner's lawyer had relied on the 
language suggesting that attachment for the purpose of securing jurisdic-
tion was an "extraordinary situation" that warranted an exception to 
the notice and hearing requirements. However, if the defendants were 
constitutionally subject to in personam jurisdiction, then there was no 
"extraordinary situation," because all Delaware would have to do to 
obtain jurisdiction was enact a long-arm or consent statute.45 
Interestingly, neither Heitner's brief nor Maschio's argument on 
Heitner's behalf offered much of a defense of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
The brief does not even cite Harris v. Balk, which had upheld the use of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction with respect to intangible property. Nor does it 
rely on Ownbey v. Morgan. Indeed, at oral argument, Maschio conceded 
that he did not think that Ownbey would be decided the same way 
today.46 According to Maschio, the decision not to defend quasi in rem 
jurisdiction was a conscious strategy.47 He explained that as soon as the 
Court agreed to hear this case, he and the other lawyers in his firm 
concluded that the Court did so in order to "overrule Pennoyer v. Neff." 
Rather than weigh in on this issue, they thought it better to try to win 
42 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5. 
43 See Appellee's Answering Brief at 4. 
44 See id. at 13-14; Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, 4 7-48. 
45 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49; see also Ernest Folk & Peter Morgan, 
Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 766-67 
(1973). 
46 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41. 
47 Telephone Interview with Michael Maschio (Oct. 13, 2003). 
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the case by arguing that "if the doctrine of International Shoe and 
Hanson is said to apply in this case, we meet those qualifications."48 
Neither party raised or was prepared to address another critical 
issue-whether the judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court was a 
"final judgment." The Chancery Court had denied a motion to quash 
and vacate the sequestration order. The Delaware Supreme Court had 
affirmed the denial of the motion. Thus, there was no final judgment on 
the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), requires a "[f]inal judgment[] or 
decree[] rendered by the highest court of the State." Ordinarily, a final 
judgment is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. " 49 Obviously, this 
was not the case here. At the end of Maschio's presentation, the Court 
raised this issue and then pursued it with Reese in his rebuttal. This was 
an issue that neither Maschio nor Reese had considered. 50 
The Supreme Court Decision 
The Majority Opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Unlike 
the Delaware courts, the Supreme Court did see a serious constitutional 
question with respect to International Shoe. "We think that the time is 
ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice 
set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem 
as well as in personam," wrote Justice Marshall for the Court.51 The 
Court concluded in the affirmative, and it held that Delaware's assertion 
of jurisdiction violated that standard. It declined to decide whether pre-
attachment notice and hearing were required. 
Thus, the Court's opinion focused little on the arguments advanced 
by the parties. Instead, the Court appears to have relied on the analysis 
set forth in several lower court opinions. 52 William Schwarzer, who had 
argued the case for the defendants in the Delaware Supreme Court, 
observed that as he worked on the case, he "had no idea that the case 
would result in the Court overruling Pennoyer v. Neff,'' and he charac-
48 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4 7. 
49 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
50 Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, 52. 
51433 U.S. at 206. Note that the Court used "in rem" as shorthand for in rem and 
quasi in rem. Id. at 199 n.17. Incidentally, Justice Marshall wrote for Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist did not participate. 
52 See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 
(1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., 
concurring). 
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terized the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion as an example of "the Court 
running away with the case."53 
The Court first addressed the issue of its own appellate jurisdiction 
in a footnote and held that the Delaware decision was a final judgment 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The Court explained that the 
decision was " 'not subject to further review in the state courts' " and 
that although the defendants might ultimately prevail on the merits 
following a trial, " 'there should be no trial at all.' " The Court stressed 
that its conclusion was "'consistent with the pragmatic approach that 
we have followed in the past in determining finality.' " 54 
The Court then turned to a historical survey of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine from Pennoyer through International Shoe and its progeny. 
Noting that suits "against" property are really suits against the owner, 
the Court asserted that "Fourteenth Amendment rights cannot depend 
on the classification of an action as in rem or in personam." The Court 
next, in Part III of its opinion, considered and rejected several argu-
ments in favor of retaining the traditional rule with respect to the 
presence of property-that it facilitates enforcement of judgments, that 
it provides jurisdictional certainty, and that it is constitutional because it 
has been historically accepted. After rejecting all of these arguments, the 
Court concluded that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be 
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and 
its progeny." Notwithstanding this language, the Court did not prohibit 
the use of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court 
suggested that when "claims to the property itself are the source of the 
underlying controversy ... , it would be unusual for the State where the 
property is located not to have jurisdiction."55 But in this case, attach-
ment jurisdiction was not reasonable. 
In Part IV, the final section of the opinion, the Court applied the 
"standards set forth in International Shoe" to the facts of Shaffer 
considered as an in personam case. The Court concluded that the officers 
and directors of this Delaware corporation had insufficient contacts with 
Delaware to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware. The Court 
stressed that there was no allegation that the defendants had "ever set 
foot in Delaware,"56 a type of physical contact that International Shoe 
53 Telephone Interview with William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge 
for the Northern District of California (Oct. 27, 2003). Schwarzer had planned to argue the 
case in the U.S. Supreme Court, but was appointed to the federal bench before he could do 
so. 
' 
54 433 U.S. at 195 n.12 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485-86 
(1975)). 
55 Id. at 206, 212, 207. 
56 433 U.S. at 213. 
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and its progeny seemed to disavow as a necessary condition for power.57 
The Court also discounted Delaware's interest in asserting jurisdiction 
over officers and directors of Delaware corporations on the ground that 
Delaware had not enacted legislation designed for this purpose. The 
Court did not explain why the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court 
was not sufficient to establish Delaware's interest. Finally, the Court 
responded to Heitner' s argument that Delaware law provides substantial 
benefits to the officers and directors of Delaware corporations and that it 
was therefore fair to expect them to answer in Delaware when they were 
accused of abusing their power. According to the Court, this argument 
simply established that it was fair to apply Delaware law, but not that it 
was fair to litigate in Delaware. The Court never explained why if these 
directors could be subjected to the sovereign power of Delaware as 
reflected in Delaware's substantive law, they could not be subjected to 
Delaware's judicial authority. As Professor Silberman has memorably 
observed, it is as if the Court thought "an accused is more concerned 
with where he will be hanged than whether."58 
The Court had been divided on whether to reach the issue of Part 
IV. There was no factual record concerning the defendants' contacts with 
Delaware, although Heitner had argued that the defendants had suffi-
cient contacts by virtue of being officers and directors of a Delaware 
corporation. At Justice Brennan's request, Justice Marshall circulated an 
alternative draft in which the Court simply ordered a remand. While 
Justices Brennan and Stewart favored a remand,59 the rest of the Court 
preferred to reach this issue. Justice Powell in a memo to Justice 
Marshall offered his rationale: 
I agree with Byron [White] that the issue of minimum contacts was 
addressed by the parties and the entire thrust of your opinion-as I 
read it-supports the view that fairness requires more than the 
minimal contacts present in this case. In short, I would reverse. 
There is also a "make weight" reason that supports reversal. 
This has all the earmarks of a lawyer-made case. There are thou-
sands of shares of Greyhound stock outstanding. Only one share-
57 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); cf Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (upholding jurisdiction despite fact that defendant had 
never visited the state). 
58 Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner; The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 88 
(1978). 
59 See Letter of Justice William Brennan to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 18, 1977; 
Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 18, 1977. All of the 
letters between the Justices cited herein are from the Thurgood Marshall papers in the 
Library of Congress, and they appear on the website collecting materials related to this 
book. 
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holder, owning one share . . . , instituted and is pressing this 
expensive litigation. While a single shareholder has standing to 
maintain a derivative shareholder suit, there are lawyers who make 
a plush living using tame clients who acquire one share of stock in 
numerous corporations for the purpose of setting the stage for 
"strike" suits. The objective usually is to force a settlement and 
claim a generous fee to be paid by court order often from corporate 
funds. 
Even if this is not such an "arranged" litigation, fairness to the 
defendants-who already must have been put to considerable ex-
pense by the holder of a single share [one share of Greyhound 
common was quoted Friday on the NYSE at $14.25; the high for the 
year to date is less than $16.00]-suggests that we dispose of the 
case here on the basis of your opinion. 60 
The Separate Opinions. Although Justice Powell was in agree-
ment with the analysis in Part IV, he had some reservations about the 
discussion of in rem jurisdiction, and he and Justice Stevens wrote 
separate concurrences. Justice Powell concurred in the majority opinion, 
while Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment. Both concurrences 
expressed complete support for the holding that "the principles of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington should be extended to govern 
assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction in a state 
court."61 However, they both also suggested that ownership of certain 
kinds of property located in a state "may, without more, provide the 
contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State 
to the extent of the value of the property."62 Justice Stevens argued that 
the presence of property in the state is sufficient for jurisdiction; Justice 
Powell suggested that the Court should at least reserve the question. 
Their opinions highlight an important ambiguity in the majority opinion. 
Although the majority opinion stated that the "standards" of Interna-
tional Shoe apply in all cases, the Court never explicitly held that those 
standards would be applied in the same way to an in rem case as they 
would to an in personam case. 
In a typical in rem or quasi in rem case, unlike an in personam case, 
the judgment is limited to the value of the property.63 This is not a mere 
60 Letter from Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 31, 1977; 
see Richard A. Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. Legal Educ. 587, 
603-05 (1989). 
61433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see id. at 217 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
62 Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); see id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
63 Of course, the Delaware sequestration statute was not, as a practical matter, so 
limited, because the defendant was required either to enter a general appearance or forfeit 
the property. 
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formal difference; it is a difference that has serious, real-life conse-
quences. It therefore might be a difference that matters in assessing 
what is "fair." Also, as Justice Stevens observed, "If I visit another 
State, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly 
assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my property 
or my person while there."64 The majority never clearly weighed in on 
this important point. Its opinion acknowledged that an in rem or quasi 
in rem judgment is limited to the value of the property, but asserted that 
the "fairness of subjecting a defendant to state-court jurisdiction does 
not depend on the size of the claim being litigated."65 This was, of 
course, not entirely responsive to Justice Stevens' point. His point was 
not that small claims are entitled to small protection but that whatever 
the value of one's property, when one knowingly locates one's property 
in a state, one creates an affiliation with that state that might make 
jurisdiction fair. 
Justice Brennan filed a dissent. He too agreed that all jurisdiction 
should be evaluated under the standards of International Shoe, but he 
argued that in applying those standards, it was fair to subject the officers 
and directors of Delaware corporations to jurisdiction in Delaware for 
suits growing out of their fiduciary duties. He stressed Delaware's strong 
interest in the litigation and argued that the same factors that make it 
appropriate to apply Delaware law to such disputes also made it appro-
priate to give Delaware's courts jurisdiction. Finally, he dismissed as 
irrelevant the fact that Delaware lacked a statute targeting directors of 
Delaware corporations. "I cannot understand how the existence of mini-
mum contacts in a constitutional sense is at all affected by Delaware's 
failure statutorily to express an interest in controlling corporate fiducia-
ries," he observed.66 
The Perfect Storm. Shaffer v. Heitner was a "perfect storm" with 
respect to quasi in rem jurisdiction. Not only did it involve intangible 
property, but also Delaware used a different situs for that property than 
did every other state. It was not even a traditional application of quasi in 
rem because the defendants were not permitted to enter a limited 
appearance; instead, the property was being used to extort in personam 
jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that there were sufficient contacts for 
in personam jurisdiction, but this argument further complicated the 
issue of the need for notice and hearing before attachment; the justifica-
tion for the attachment was the need to get jurisdiction, but if there 
were sufficient contacts for in personam jurisdiction, there did not seem 
to be much need for the attachment. Finally, the case was a sharehold-
64 Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
65 Id. at 207 n.23; see also id. at 209 n.32. 
66 Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
---1 
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ers' derivative action brought by a single shareholder. It is interesting to 
speculate whether the opinion would have been written differently if the 
property attached had been in-state tangible property, if the state had 
allowed a limited appearance, or if the case had involved a tort injuring a 
local plaintiff in the forum state who could not get in personam jurisdic-
tion because the defendant did not have purposeful contacts with the 
forum state. 
Likewise, one might wonder whether the opinion might have been 
written differently if the case had been argued with a more spirited 
defense of quasi in rem jurisdiction. It is worth remembering, however, 
that Heitner's goal was to allow this case to proceed in Delaware. He had 
no interest in a more nuanced examination of quasi in rem jurisdiction 
unless that resulted in a win. According to Maschio, he did not argue for 
a remand because he did not want one.67 A shareholders' derivative suit 
is a complex and expensive type of litigation. Maschio and the other 
lawyers in his firm did not want to return to the Delaware courts for 
more procedural wrangling over jurisdiction. They preferred either to 
win with certainty that they could proceed or to cut their losses by an 
end to the litigation. The defendants' lawyer, on the other hand, indicat-
ed that a remand was one of the things that most worried him, because 
he thought it likely that Delaware would uphold jurisdiction.68 Since the 
plaintiff did not argue for a remand, this was not an issue that the 
defendants' lawyers ever had to address directly. 
The Immediate Impact of Shaffer 
As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the shareholders' 
derivative suit brought by Heitner in Delaware was dismissed and never 
refiled. 
A mere thirteen days after Shaffer was handed down, Delaware 
signed into law a new director-consent statute.69 That statute provided 
that henceforth by being a director of a Delaware corporation, a director 
consents to be sued in Delaware in any suit against the corporation in 
which he is a necessary party or in any suit alleging violation of his duty 
as a director. The synopsis of the law explained that: 
Delaware has a substantial interest in defining, regulating and 
enforcing the fiduciary obligations which directors of Delaware cor-
porations owe to such corporations and shareholders who elected 
67 Telephone Interview with Michael Maschio (Oct. 13, 2003). 
68 Telephone Interview with John Reese (Oct. 28, 2003). 
69 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (signed July 7, 1977, and amended as of Jan. 1, 2004, 
to cover officers as well). 
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them. In promoting that interest it is essential that Delaware afford 
a convenient and available forum for supervising the affairs of 
Delaware corporations and the conduct of directors of Delaware 
corporatiqns. 70 
The legislative history does not reveal why Delaware responded so 
quickly. Edmund Carpenter, who represented the defendants in the 
Delaware Chancery Court, offered a theory.71 He explained that the 
sequestration statute was very popular with the Delaware bar, presum-
ably because it increased the pool of cases in Delaware for which 
Delaware lawyers could provide representation. Indeed, he mused that 
he was probably not very popular among his colleagues for having raised 
his challenge to the statute. He speculated that the bar followed Shaffer 
very closely and had probably been thinking of a response in the event 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided as it did. In any event, the constitution-
ality of this statute was later upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court. 72 
International Shoe had disavowed reliance on "fictions of implied con-
sent," but it would appear that such fictions remain useful. 
The Greyhound Corporation responded to this change in Delaware 
law by moving its state of incorporation to Arizona. Greyhound's man-
agement explained that "it would be an unreasonable burden upon 
directors not resident in Delaware, several of whom reside in Arizona 
and California, to be required to journey to Delaware to defend a case 
there when they have no contact with that state."73 
The Continuing Importance of Shaffer Today 
Shaffer marked the beginning of a period of intense exploration by 
the U.S. Supreme Court of the limits on state jurisdictional authority. 
Prior to Shaffer, it had been nearly twenty years since the Court had 
decided a significant jurisdiction case, that being Hanson. In just under 
thirteen years following Shaffer, the Court would decide another eleven 
cases.74 Those cases fleshed out the theory implicit in Shaffer. 
70 Synopsis, Del. Sen. Bill No. 341 (1977), quoted in Sue Ann Dillport, Jurisdiction over 
Nonresident Directors, Officers, and Shareholders: "Director" Consent Statutes After Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 255, 267 n.75 (1979). 
71 Telephone Interview with Edmund Carpenter, II (Oct. 20, 2003). 
72 Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980); see In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota 
Antitrust Litig., 525 F.Supp. 1265, 1271 CD. Md. 1981) (upholding similar statute in 
another state); Stearn v. Malloy, 89 F.R.D. 421, 424 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (same). 
73 Quoted in David L. Ratner & Donald E. Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner 
on the Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 Brook. L. Rev. 641, 653-54 (1979). 
74 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); 
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Shaffer also marked the Court's endorsement of Hanson's emphasis 
for personal jurisdiction on purposeful availment by the defendant, 
rather than McGee's focus on reasonableness that would include the 
interests of the plaintiff and the state in assuring a remedy. In holding 
that Delaware lacked jurisdiction over the officers and directors of a 
Delaware corporation sued for breach of their fiduciary obligations in 
violation of Delaware law, the Court stressed that the defendants never 
"purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum State."75 Subsequent cases would reiterate this 
language and build on the requirement of "purposeful availment" by the 
defendant. 76 
Although Shaffer is significant for its endorsement of the purpose-
ful-availment test, the Court's actual application of that test to the facts 
of Shaffer has not proved influential. Eight years after Shaffer, in Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,77 the Court upheld personal jurisdiction in a 
situation that had many similarities with Shaffer. Justice Brennan, who 
had dissented from Part IV of Shaffer, wrote Burger King and made no 
effort to distinguish Shaffer; instead, he just ignored it. Burger King 
involved a suit by a huge Florida-based franchisor against its Michigan 
franchisee. The Court upheld Florida jurisdiction over the Michigan 
franchisee although there was no evidence that the defendant had "ever 
set foot" in Florida. The Court stressed that the franchisee had entered 
into a long-term contractual relationship with the Florida company and 
derived benefits from that relationship. One might have said the same 
about the directors in Shaffer. The Burger King Court also thought it 
significant that the franchise contract included a choice-of-law clause 
selecting Florida law. Again, one might have said the same about the 
application of Delaware law in Shaffer. Of course, there are differences 
between Shaffer and Burger King. What is striking, however, is that 
even though the lower court had relied in part on Shaffer to dismiss,78 
the Burger King majority did not feel the need to distinguish Shaffer, 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom-
bia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites 
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 
(1978). 
75 433 U.S. at 216 (quoting, with brackets, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958)). 
76 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). ' 
77 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
78 Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 
U.S. 462 (1985). 
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and even the dissenters in Burger King did not rely on Shaffer as a basis 
for their conclusion against jurisdiction. Today, Part IV is primarily cited 
to uphold jurisdiction over corporate directors based on state consent 
statutes.79 Bey~nd this, it is largely ignored. 
Likewise, the impact of the opinion's Part III on attachment juris-
diction remains uncertain. Several states, including notably New York, 
continue to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction, attaching bank accounts 
as the basis for jurisdiction. 80 These states in essence rely on the theory 
suggested by the Powell and Stevens concurrences. Moreover, Congress 
has turned to in rem jurisdiction as a technique to secure jurisdiction in 
certain Internet cases. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
of 1999 provides that if an Internet domain name violates the rights of a 
registered trademark and if the trademark owner is not able to obtain in 
personam jurisdiction over the offending domain name owner, the trade-
mark owner may bring an in rem action against the domain name.81 For 
purposes of such an action, the "situs" of the domain name is deemed to 
be the place where the domain name "registrar, registry, or other 
domain name authority" is located. In upholding the constitutionality of 
the statute, a district court in Virginia has explained, "under Shaffer, 
there must be minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in 
those in rem proceedings where the underlying cause of action is 
unrelated to the property which is located in the forum state. Here the 
property, that is, the domain name, is not only related to the cause of 
action but is its entire subject matter."82 Other courts and commentators 
have questioned this interpretation of Shaffer. 83 Eventually, the Supreme 
Court may need to reenter this arena and clarify the law. 
Even aspects of Shaffer's core analysis with respect to attachment 
jurisdiction have been called into question by Burnham v. Superior 
79 See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F.Supp. 1265, 1271 (D. Md. 
1981); Stearn v. Malloy, 89 F.R.D. 421, 424 (E.D. Wis. 1981). 
so See Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of 
a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 1059, 1089-99 (1990); Holly Haskew, 
Shaffer, Burnham, and New York's Continuing Use of QIR-2 Jurisdiction: A Resurrection 
of the Power Theory, 45 Emory L.J. 239, 258-66 (1996). 
s115 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). 
82 Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F.Supp.2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
The court also rejected the argument that a domain name registration is not a proper kind 
of thing to serve as a res: "There is no prohibition on a legislative body making something 
property. Even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data property 
and assign its place of registration as its situs." Id. 
83 See, e.g, FleetBoston Financial Corp. v. FleetBostonFinancial.com, 138 F.Supp.2d 
121 (D. Mass. 2001); Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in 
Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 989, 1006-18 (2002). 
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Court, 84 the last of the Supreme Court's set of jurisdiction cases. Burn-
ham involved jurisdiction based solely on the transient presence of the 
defendant who was served with process while in the forum state. Many 
observers and a few lower courts had concluded that after Shaffer such 
"tag" jurisdiction was unconstitutional.85 They reasoned that Shaffer 
had cracked the remaining bedrock principle of Pennoyer-that "every 
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory."86 Shaffer had undermined the "property" 
portion of this principle, and therefore the "persons" portion seemed 
equally vulnerable. 
The predictions proved wrong. In Burnham, the Court unanimously, 
though without a majority opinion, upheld the constitutionality of tag 
jurisdiction. Justice Scalia, writing for at most a plurality, offered a 
narrow reading of Shaffer. According to him, Shaffer simply dealt with 
suits "against" property. International Shoe dealt with suits against 
people, but that case had explicitly stated that its "fair play and 
substantial justice" analysis applied only where the defendant "be not 
present within the territory of the forum."87 Thus, neither Shaffer nor 
International Shoe had anything to say about situations in which the 
defendant was physically present within the forum state. After reviewing 
the historical record, Justice Scalia concluded that tag jurisdiction was 
considered acceptable at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that therefore it could not violate the Due Process 
Clause. 
Justice Scalia admitted that the broader approach of the Shaffer 
Court presented something of a problem for his analysis. Shaffer had 
conducted an independent inquiry into the desirability and fairness of 
attachment jurisdiction, explaining that " 'traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of 
ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new 
procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitu-
tional heritage."88 Justice Scalia has repeatedly rejected this type of 
84 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
85 See, e.g., Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F.Supp. 305, 312 
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Hans Smit, The Implications of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal, 45 
Brook. L. Rev. 519, 523 (1979); David Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam 
Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 Wash. U. L.Q. 273, 
303; Jack Friedenthal, A Comment on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner in the Classroom, 
1978 Wash. U. L.Q. 319, 320. 
86 95 U.S. at 722. 
87 326 U.S. at 316. 
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open-ended fairness analysis of the Due Process Clause,89 calling it 
"imperious": "'Due process' ... does not mean that process which 
shifting majorities of this Court feel to be 'due,' " he argued in Burn-
ham.90 He reconciled the approach in Shaffer with his historical approach 
by observing 'that perhaps Shaffer's approach "can be sustained when 
the 'perpetuation of ancient forms' is engaged in by only a very small 
minority of the States" and by noting that Delaware was alone in 
treating the state of incorporation as the situs of stock. 91 Thus, Justice 
Scalia's opinion suggests that Shaffer should be read narrowly to apply 
only to cases involving "intangible property that has no reasonable 
nexus with the forum." 92 Interestingly, Justice Scalia has continued to 
suggest that Shaffer should be read narrowly, if not outright overruled, 
arguing that the case, "at least in [its] broad pronouncements if not with 
respect to the particular provisions at issue, [was] wrongly decided" and 
that because the Shaffer "rationale has no basis in constitutional text 
and itself contradicts opinions never explicitly overruled [it] has no valid 
stare decisis claim upon me. " 93 
In some respects, the aspect of Shaffer that was most influential in 
shaping the future of jurisdiction law is the issue that neither party even 
noticed-whether the state-court determination was immediately appeal-
able. Over the next few years, many of the Court's most important 
jurisdiction decisions would arise on appeals from state courts that had 
upheld jurisdiction but where no final judgment on the merits had been 
entered. 94 Interestingly, eleven years after Shaffer, in Van Cauwenberghe 
u. Biard, 95 the Supreme Court would undermine this aspect of Shaffer, 
suggesting that a decision upholding jurisdiction is not a final judgment 
at least for purposes of reviewing federal-court decisions pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. However, by then the Court had decided most of its 
significant jurisdiction cases. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the erosion of the applicational aspects of its 
holding, Shaffer remains a staple of first-year civil procedure courses 
89 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
90 495 U.S. at 627 n.5. 
91 Id. at 622. 
92 Russell Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 
Rutgers L.J. 611, 623 (1991). 
93 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
94 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Rush v. 
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); 
Kulka v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
95 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988). 
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because it laid the important theoretical foundation for the Court's 
subsequent jurisdiction cases. Justice Stewart had predicted as much. A 
month before the case was handed down, Justice Stewart commended 
Justice Marshall on his draft opinion, writing: 
This seems to me one of the most interesting cases we have had 
here in a long time. I think you have written an excellent opinion, 
and if, as I hope, it becomes the opinion of the Court, it will surely 
be immortalized as required reading for every first year law student 
in the country for years to come.96 
Similarly, Justice Powell called Justice Marshall's opinion "a 'must' for 
the textbooks. " 97 
Shaffer-and indeed the entire set of Supreme Court cases on 
territorial jurisdiction-will likely retain their preeminence as part of the 
first-year curriculum in law schools. The reason is that jurisdiction is a 
topic that implicates both the identity of states as sovereigns and also 
the core questions about when governments can legitimately exercise 
power over individuals. As one commentator has observed, "Jurisdiction 
is power."98 Shaffer u. Heitner helps establish the modern framework for 
analyzing when that power can reasonably be exercised. 
96 Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 18, 1977. 
97 Letter from Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., to Justice Thurgood Marshall, May 31, 1977. 
98 Donald Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of 
Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 Brook. L. Rev. 565, 568 (1979). 
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